This paper assesses the ten years of experience of East Central European (ECE) with the reform of the judiciary in view of EU accession. The paper examines in depth the cases where the challenges to rule of law and the EU conditionality were both at a maximum to generate some explanations (Romania, and Bulgaria in particular). It then proceeds to test the chief explanatory factors in a quantitative model of rule of law on the 28 postcommunist cases, concluding that democracy, and not organization or logistics is the most important determinant of rule of law.
reviews this assistance effort and tries to assess the results and to learn from the process leading to them. Is EU accountable for the progress registered by the most advanced East European countries, and if so why had its positive influence decreased in the last ten years of accession compared to the first ten years of transition? Did EU external assistance and conditionality succeed in advancing rule of law in new member countries? What does this experience teach us about rule of law promotion in general? To answer these questions, I
shall firstly explain the interest of the EU in this particular field; secondly, I will discuss the background of the state of the rule of law of East-Central Europe prior to accession; thirdly, I will look in depth at the cases where the challenge and EU influence were both at a maximum to generate some explanations 5 ; and lastly, I will test the explanatory factors in more systematic comparative analysis using all post-communist cases.
Approaches to the definition of rule of law can be located on a continuum ranging from thin and more procedural understandings to thick and substantial definitions. 6 While the latter is clearly closely associated with democracy in its more qualitative form, 7 the former is restricted to having any rules at all. 8 Alternatively, we can distinguish between instrumental approaches, which see rule of law as appropriate laws on the statute book, a trustworthy, efficient and independent judiciary and effective law enforcement, and more ambitious ends driven approaches. 9 The latter see rule of law as a complex outcome resulting from a long historical evolution including a government subject to law, equality before the law, human rights or law and order. Assisting the former is simpler in practical terms, as it provides an easy guide to programming: but any assessment of the final outcome -rule of law itself-will invariably trespass on the broader definition. It is also . 5 The sources for the data presented here are interviews with: OECD Sigma consultants (2); World Bank consultants working on rule of law and civil service reform (4); EU consultants in the field of rule of law (2); a questionnaire distributed via the Council of Europe GRECO network (on challenges faced after accession by anticorruption agencies addressed to all ten new member countries) and its discussion in a workshop in Berlin in November 2009 at the Hertie School of Governance; country negotiators from the Czech Republic and Romania (2); the materials of the Transparency International IACC workshop on lessons learned from EU anticorruption policy in Athens, 2004; and (2005) .
this comprehensive version of rule of law, equivalent to the quality of the overall institutional framework of a society, which rules over other alternative explanations of development. 10 In the words of Daniel Kaufman "an improvement in the rule of law by one standard deviation from the current levels in Ukraine to those "middling" levels prevailing in South Africa would lead to a fourfold increase in per capita income in the long run ". 11 But what this standard deviation actually measures is quite difficult to establish: a complex societal equilibrium historically reached, so difficult to capture in simple policy evaluation language.
Notwithstanding the practical difficulties of operationalizing such general concepts and assessing the results in a short or medium term perspective, such conclusions from the World Bank widely translated across the donor community into policies and programs of getting that one standard deviation evolution. Governments were asked to develop policies to implement the rule of law and the donors on both sides of the Atlantic mobilized to guide and fund such efforts 12 . As former British colonies top the hierarchies of good governance, Endowment review of rule of law assistance efforts sent rather pessimistic warnings a few years ago when stating that "Rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is the easy part.
[…]Rule of law reform will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who lacked democratic legitimacy as laws were produced by a single party system. The prosecutors' body (prokuratura) was a powerful instrument of the communist state and its main legal arm. In practice, judges were subordinated to prosecutors; even procedurally, prosecutors had an overall power to control the legality of any activity, in and outside the judicial system, and to apply sanctions. Interference with the decision-making was common, and the so-called 'telephone justice' was largely spread among both judges and prosecutors.
Military prosecutors and judges formed a parallel system of justice, and they enjoyed a higher status in the society. In the same way the relation between judge and prosecutor was reversed compared to an established democracy, the position of policemen was stronger than the position of prosecutors. Despite changes in legislation after 1989, these institutional arrangements proved difficult to eliminate overnight.
As the law was neither just nor predictable under Communism, informality flourished in these countries; this is one of the most serious institutional legacies they are left with. To put it simply, a normal citizen of Communist Romania in 1989 was walking on the brink of prison from morning till late night and the fact that few got arrested in the end was usually interpreted as proof of indulgence from the state rather than of its inability to cope with such massive law infringement. For instance, a couple going to bed risked breaking the law, as in 1989 Romania it was legally forbidden to practice any form of contraception under serious penalties for both the offender and the medical staff assisting an eventual abortion (unless she had already four children). A couple who preferred reading instead, risked breaking the numerous regulations concerning electricity savings. Listening to the radio -since the only alternative to domestic programs filled with poets praising the Ceausescu family people was Radio Free Europe or Voice of America -was a serious crime. Driving to work was problematic, as the monthly quota of 20 liters of gas was quickly exhausted and the police had the right to investigate the source of any additional gasoline, which could have only resulted from an illegal sale. Work also meant to slalom between forbidden things, regardless whether one was in a factory or in a university -and this enumeration could go on. From 1989 on, the history of reinstating the rule of law is similar in all postcommunist transition countries. The governments had to rule on the basis of Communist legislation due to the inability of replacing it all overnight. It could have been cancelled, but the agreement was that "the umbrella principle of upholding the law meant that however bad or inappropriate communist laws should continue to apply until revoked or amended".
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New laws regulated first and foremost political competition, and only then legislators have slowly moved to other areas. In many countries that meant that the corpus of law in force remained internally contradictory and laws were not always consistent with one another.
New legislators, though democratically elected, also proved often to be incompetent and Democratization drove the initial reforms: the success of anticommunist parties in the first free ballot in Central Europe helped these countries achieve judicial independence early in the nineties; despite a later start, Eastern and Western Balkans followed in granting still to address) and finally a group of countries which have simply preserved the essentials of their past institutions (see Table 1 significantly, but also due to the fact that they started at the very bottom with the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Former Soviet Union, except for Georgia, stagnated.
The lack of sufficient progress is particularly problematic for Bulgaria and Romania, who were trailing behind the other countries from the start. The Czech Republic, which had been on top, registered the largest regress since 1999; Slovakia, after some years of catch up prior to accession, regressed after accession.
The mixed and non-conclusive results so far of the domestic judiciaries reform after 1999 is showed also in the high rate of appeal to the key stakeholders in the government 40 . 'Soft' power was over and hard power returned with a vengeance.
Explaining EU's limited influence in the field of rule of law
The remarkable transformative role of the EU enlargement is well covered by the scholarly literature. 41 There is little doubt that enlargement brings tremendous direct and indirect advantages to an invited country, instantly priming it as a successful transformation, so encouraging investment on top of EU funds. It is easy to notice that new EU members are doing far better than the rest of ECE: but on one hand they are both geographically and historically closer to Western Europe, and on the other they were invited to join after they had already proven successful. What we know less is the internal mechanism of Europeanization. What makes it work when it works? And what prevents it from working when it does not work? The chapter of rule of law, one of the most difficult assistance areas, and the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, which were not enjoying successful transitions by the time they were invited to join, are privileged situations to reflect at such questions. To understand EU influence, we have to look both at the supply side -the EU's rule of law promotion efforts -and at the demand side-national circumstances and factors in the recipient countries.
The supply side -EU efforts -was not without problems. One problem was the speed and timing of the process: the time factor. In the effort not to miss the political opportunity, while at the same time not allowing any room of real negotiations with the newcomers (who had to adopt the acquis in full), the whole accession process became quite bureaucratic. The impact evaluations, but by the need to satisfy the pressing bureaucratic reporting needs for the regular monitoring reports of the European Commission. "One-off special efforts" to reach certain EU targets and "islands of excellence" administrative units empowered in this respect prevailed as approaches versus sound, system-building reform. 42 As the Commission went quite far in suggesting concrete means to achieve targets (like the creation of new government bodies) and governments needed positive ratings for their efforts to keep up the pace of the accession process, a sort of 'prescription-based' evaluation mechanism was created. Countries were thus rated in the monitoring not by the effectiveness of reforms or even their real change potential, but by the number of 'prescription pills' taken. A 'patient' or assisted country was rated higher the more advice it accepted, with little checking of 'symptoms'. Latvia became a success of anticorruption (it soon showed it was not) not because they had managed, but because they followed all the steps they were suggested to.
The situation applies particularly to the so-called 'Helsinki group', countries invited only in 1999, keen to do whatever they were suggested in order to catch up with the first more advanced group (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary). In the most spectacular case, The second problem on the supply side was to take a 'performance' approach, presuming that political will existed and the whole problem was one of capacity, which can be built regardless the motivation for change of the judiciary, if certain organization steps are adopted. As the Commission perceived correctly that the rule of law varied across countries, The evidence from Latin America had already shown, however, that independence is a complex phenomenon and the introduction of Judicial Councils does not solve the problem.
Even though judges may be independent from direct political control, they may become dependent on other forces such as senior judges in a judicial hierarchy, or they may become plainly unaccountable and corrupt. 45 Reforms in Romania and Bulgaria had frequently to be pushed against the will of those supposed to implement them. reform. 61 These countries covered a lot of grounds in twenty years, but twenty years is simply not enough from Ceausescu's power monopoly to rule of law.
Testing explanations for the rule of law in East Central Europe
The disagreement between the pessimists and the optimists of rule of law promotion finds a A test of our hypotheses returns unequivocal results (see Table 2 ). The most important determinant of rule of law is democracy, measured either as civil liberties score from Freedom House, or in years since a country is declared free by FH. Corruption also matters greatly: the Corruption Perception Index and the evaluation of the judiciary by Freedom House that we used are closely associated. The Communist legacies also proved a significant determinant: the fewer years a country has spent under Communism, the greater the chances it will be closer to the rule of law. Development, measured either as Human Development Index, or as GDP/capita, or finally as Courts budget (CEPEJ data, for only twenty countries) proved insignificant with the proper controls. Also, the EU influence proved significant only in bivariate regressions, so it was dropped from the final model. The organization of the judiciary proved equally insignificant: one cannot predict rule of law based on a country's magistrates being appointed solely by the executive versus any other institutional arrangements. No specific form of judiciary organization seems to matter, which is unsurprising seeing that one cannot compare a Judicial Council which has real power to one which has nominal power only: there are too many informal institutions in the modus operandi of the justice systems in these countries for the formal structures to make any difference. The final model includes the four significant factors: Communist legacy, degree of democratization and corruption, with a control for development (Human Development from UNDP) and explains nearly all variation. Europeanization is not driven by European conditionality as much as by domestic drive to emulate and reform. In the absence of reform minded elites being in the driver's seat, no form of judicial organization suggested or imposed from outside cannot work some miracle.
As the best instruments to promote rule of law are not technical, but political, assistance for rule of law will gain effectiveness if it stops relying solely on assisting the government. To develop accountability, power distribution has to be balanced, and this presumes endorsing domestic drivers of change wherever they are to be found, government, opposition, media or civil society. 
